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There exists a large strand of literature on economic growth, climate change and tech-
nological improvements (see for instance Bosetti et al., 2006 and 2009; Edenhofer et al.,
2005 and 2006; Gerlagh 2006; Gerlagh and Van Der Zwaan 2006; Nordhaus, 2008; Popp,
2006a and 2006b). In these models, the analysis usually focuses on the optimal trajectories
and their comparison with the business-as-usual scenario. For many reasons that will be
discussed below, it may be relevant to examine some intermediate cases between these two
polar ones. Nevertheless, a decentralized economy framework is required to perform such
an analysis. The main objective of this paper is to complete the literature mentioned above
by setting up a general equilibrium analysis that allows to compute any equilibrium in the
decentralized economy.
A full description of the set of equilibria o￿ers several advantages. Under a positive
point of view, it allows to examine how the economy reacts to policy changes. We can
thus look at the individual e￿ects of a given policy instrument as well as a given subset
of them, the other ones being kept unchanged. This will give some insights on the com-
plementarity/substitutability of public tools. Under a normative point of view, as usual,
this approach allows for the computation of the economic instruments that restore the
￿rst-best optimum. However, because of budgetary, socioeconomic or political constraints,
the enforcement of ￿rst-best optimum can be di￿cult to achieve for the policy-maker that
would rather implement second-best solutions. Finally, another advantage is the possibility
to compare the outcome of a cost-bene￿t analysis in a partial equilibrium approach (e.g.
Gerlagh et al., 2008) with the one obtained from a general equilibrium framework.
In line with the "top-down" approach and based on the DICE and ENTICE-BR models
(Nordhaus, 2008, and Popp, 2006a, respectively), we develop an endogenous growth model
in which energy services can be produced from a polluting non-renewable resource as
well as a clean backstop. Moreover, we assume that carbon emissions can be partially
released thanks to CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) technology. We introduce three
R&D sectors, the ￿rst one improving the e￿ciency of energy production, the second one,
the e￿ciency of the backstop and the last one, the e￿ciency of the sequestration process.
With this respect, we have to consider two types of market failures: the pollution associated
with the atmospheric release of carbon and the research spillovers in each R&D sector.
For this matter, in the decentralized equilibrium, we introduce two kinds of economic
2policy instruments in accordance: an environmental tax on the carbon emissions and a
research subsidy for the energy, backstop and CCS R&D sectors. There is an equilibrium
associated to each vector of instruments. Clearly, when public instruments are optimally
set, the equilibrium of the decentralized economy coincides with the ￿rst best optimum.
In particular, we provide a full expression of the optimal carbon tax and we analyze its
dynamic properties. As in Goulder and Mathai (2000), we show that the tax can evolve
non-monotonically over time and we characterize the driving forces that make it either
growing or declining.
At this point, three remarks can be formulated. The ￿rst one is related to the way
we deal with R&D sectors in the decentralized framework. In the standard endogenous
growth theory (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Romer, 1990...), the production of an innovation
is associated with a particular intermediate good. Research is funded by the monopoly
pro￿ts of intermediate producers who bene￿t from an exclusive right, like a patent, for
the production and the sale of these goods. In this paper, to simplify the analysis, we do
not explicitly introduce tangible intermediate goods in research sectors, as it is done for
instance by Gerlagh and Lise (2005), Edenhofer et al. (2006) and Popp (2006a). Then,
we adopt the shortcut proposed by Grimaud and RougØ (2008) in the case of growth
models with polluting resources and environmental concerns. This approach is based on
the comparison between the socially optimal value of innovations and the private one, which
emerges at the decentralized equilibrium. Several empirical studies (Jones and Williams,
1998; Popp, 2006a) ￿nd that this last value is lower than the former one. This is justi￿ed
in the standard literature by the presence of some failures that prevent the decentralized
equilibrium to implement the ￿rst-best optimum. We use these studies to build the "laisser-
faire" equilibrium. Finally, research subsidies can be enforced in order to reduce the gap
between these social and private values1.
The second remark is a technical one which concerns the computation of the eco-
nomic variables, quantities and prices, in the decentralized economy. As usual, the ￿rst
step consists in studying the behavior of agents and, under market clearing conditions, in
characterizing the equilibrium trajectory. In a second step, we show that there exists an
1According to the OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics, publicly-funded energy R&D in
2004 among OECD countries amounted to 9.72 billion US$, which represented 4% of overall public R&D
budgets. In the United States, energy investments from the private sector have shrunk during the last
decade; governmental funding currently represents 76% of total US energy R&D expenditures (Nemet and
Kammen, 2007).
3optimization program whose the solution is the same as the equilibrium one. This allows
the numerical computation of any equilibrium trajectories in a calibrated model.
The last remark is about the particular decarbonisation technology considered. As
recommended by the IPCC, abatement technologies reveal crucial for the implementation
of a cost-e￿ective climate change mitigation policy. Such abatement technologies notably
include renewable energy but also the possibility to reduce the carbon footprint of fossil
fuel burning. According to the IPCC (2005), carbon capture and storage (CCS) o￿ers
promising prospects. This process consists in separating the carbon dioxide from other
￿ux gases during the process of energy production. It is particularly adapted to large-scale
centralized power stations but may also indirectly apply to non electric energy supply
(cf. Ho￿ert et al., 2002). Once captured, the gases are then being disposed into various
reservoirs, such as depleted oil and gas ￿elds, depleted coal mines, deep saline aquifers, or
oceans.
Next, we provide some numerical illustrations by calibrating the model to ￿t the world
2005 data. As suggested by the theory, the optimal carbon tax is generally non-monotonic
over time. We ￿nd that the implementation of this tax alone leads to the expected e￿ects
on the fossil fuel use (and then on carbon emissions), but it does not provide incentive
enough to hardly stimulate R&D activities. Similarly, research policies alone have high
impacts on R&D activities, but their e￿ect on the atmospheric carbon accumulation is very
low. In other words, the crossed e￿ects of each policy instrument are weak. Moreover, the
simultaneous use of these two types of public tools reinforces the individual role of each one,
thus revealing high complementarity between them. For instance, we observe numerically
that the simultaneous implementation of a carbon tax and appropriate R&D subsidies can
strengthen the role of the backstop and of the CCS. Finally, the recourse to these two
abatement options is reinforced by a more ambitious carbon tax, in order to stabilize the
atmospheric carbon concentration for instance.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the decentralized economy and
studies the behavior of agents in each sector. In section 3, i) we characterize the decentral-
ized equilibrium, ii) we identify the maximization program associated with this equilibrium,
iii) we characterize the ￿rst-best optimum solutions, and iv) we compute the appropriate
public tools that implement the optimum. In section 4, we present the calibration of the
model and we derive a selection of numerical results. We conclude in section 5.
42 The decentralized economy
The model is mainly based on ENTICE-BR (Popp, 2006a) and on the last version of
DICE (Nordhaus, 2008). We consider a worldwide economy containing four production
sectors: ￿nal output, energy services, fossil fuel and carbon-free backstop. The fossil fuel
combustion process releases CO2 ￿ows which accumulate into the atmosphere, inducing a
rise of the average temperatures. Feedbacks on the economy are captured by a damage
function measuring the continuous and gradual losses in terms of ￿nal output due to global
warming (i.e. GWP losses). Moreover, an atmospheric carbon concentration cap can be
eventually introduced to take into account the high levels of uncertainty and irreversibility
that are generally avoided by the standard damage function. Industrial emissions can be
partly sequestered and stored in carbon reservoirs owing to a CCS device. The production
of ￿nal energy services, backstop and CCS require speci￿c knowledge provided by three
directed R&D sectors (in the sense of Acemoglu, 2002). We assume that all sectors, except
the R&D’s ones, are perfectly competitive. Finally, in order to correct the two types of
distortions involved by the model ￿ pollution and research spillovers ￿ we introduce two
types of policy tools: an environmental tax on the fossil fuel use and a subsidy for each
R&D sector. Note that, because of CCS, the tax applies on the residual carbon emissions
after sequestration and it is thus disconnected from the fossil resource use.
The model is sketched in Figure 1. Speci￿c functional forms and calibration details are
described in appendix A4. The following subsection derives the individual behaviors.
2.1 Behavior of agents
2.1.1 The ￿nal good sector
The production of a quantity Qt of ￿nal good depends on three endogenous elements:
capital Kt, energy services Et, and a scaling factor 
t which accounts from climate-related
damages, as discussed below. It also depends on exogenous inputs: the total factor produc-
tivity At and the population level Lt, growing at exogenous rates gA;t and gL;t respectively.
We write Qt = Q(Kt;Et;Lt;At;
t), where the production function Q(:) is assumed to have
the standard properties (increasing and concave in each argument).
Normalizing to one the price of the ￿nal output and denoting by pE;t, wt, rt and
, the price of energy services, the real wage, the interest rate2 and the depreciation
2We assume here that the representative household holds the capital and rents it to ￿rms at a rental
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Figure 1: Description of the model
rate of capital, respectively, the instantaneous pro￿t of producers is expressed as 
Q
t =
Qt   pE;tEt   wtLt   (rt + )Kt. Maximization of this pro￿t function with respect to Kt,
Lt and Et, leads to the following ￿rst-order conditions:
QK   (rt + ) = 0 (1)
QL   wt = 0 (2)
QE   pE;t = 0 (3)
where JX stands for the partial derivative of function J(:) with respect to X.
2.1.2 The energy-CCS sector
At each time t, the amount Et of energy services is produced from two primary energies ￿ a
fossil fuel Ft and a backstop energy source Bt ￿ and from a stock HE;t of speci￿c knowledge
which can improve the energy e￿ciency. The energy supply is then Et = E(Ft;Bt;HE;t),
where E(:) is assumed to be increasing and concave in each argument.
The economic and climatic systems are linked in the model by anthropogenic CO 2
emissions, generated by fossil fuel burning. Without CCS, the carbon ￿ow released into
6the atmosphere would be equal to Ft, where  is the unitary carbon content of fossil fuel.
We postulate that, at each date t, the CCS device allows a reduction of these emissions by
an amount St, 0  St  Ft and, for the sake of simplicity, that CCS activities are part of
the energy sector. To change emissions into stored carbon, the sequestration device needs
speci￿c investment spendings, IS;t, and knowledge, HS;t. The CCS technology then writes
S(Ft;IS;t;HS;t), with S(:) increasing and concave in each argument3. Note that in our
model, we consider neither limited capacity of carbon sinks nor leakage problems. These
questions are addressed, for instance, by La￿orgue et al. (2008) and Keller et al. (2007)
respectively.
Denoting by pF;t and pB;t the fossil fuel and backstop prices, and by t the unitary
carbon tax on the ￿ow of carbon emissions (Ft  St), the energy producer chooses Ft, Bt
and IS;t that maximizes its instantaneous pro￿t E
t = pE;tEt   pF;tFt   pB;tBt   IS;t  
t(Ft   St). The ￿rst order conditions write:
pE;tEF   pF;t   t(   SF) = 0 (4)
pE;tEB   pB;t = 0 (5)
 1 + tSIS = 0 (6)
Condition (6) equalizes the private cost of one unit of stockpiled carbon, 1=SIS, with the
carbon tax. Moreover, the extended unit cost of fossil fuel use, including the fuel price,
the environmental penalty and the sequestration cost, can be de￿ned as:







2.1.3 The primary energy sectors
At each time t, the extraction ￿ow Ft of fossil resource depends on speci￿c productive
investments, IF;t, and on the cumulated past extraction, Zt. As in Popp (2006a) or in
Gerlagh and Lise (2005), we do not explicitly model an initial fossil resource stock that is
exhausted, but we focus on the increase in the extraction cost as the resource is depleted.




Fsds ) _ Zt = Ft (8)
3In a Romer model with tangible intermediate goods, the energy and CCS production functions would





















the jth intermediate good and f
n(:) is an increasing and strictly concave function, for n = fE;Sg.
7The fossil fuel extraction function is denoted by F(IF;t;Zt), where F(:) is increasing and








0 rsdsdt subject to (8), where its instantaneous pro￿t is F
t =




0 rsds + tFIF = 0 (9)
pF;tFZe 
R t
0 rsds + tFZ =  _ t (10)
Combining these two equations, and using the transversality condition limt!1 tZt = 0,












Di￿erentiating (11) with respect to time, it comes:















which reads as a generalized version of the Hotelling rule in the case of an extraction
technology given by function F(:). In particular, if the marginal productivity of investment
spendings coincides with the average productivity, i.e. if FIF = F(:)=IF, then it is easy
to see that (12) reduces to _ pF;t = rt(pF;t   1=FIF). In the limit case where the marginal
productivity tends to in￿nity, i.e. the marginal extraction cost tends to zero, one gets the
elementary Hotelling rule, _ pF;t=pF;t = rt.
The backstop production function B(IB;t;HB;t) is assumed to be increasing and concave
in the investment spending IB;t and in the speci￿c stock of knowledge HB;t.4 Maximization
of the pro￿t B
t = pB;tB(IB;t;HB;t)   IB;t, yields the following ￿rst-order condition:
pB;tBIB   1 = 0 (13)
2.1.4 The R&D sectors
As already mentioned in the introduction, R&D sectors generally face several distortions.
Jones and Williams (2000) identify four of them: i) the duplication e￿ect: the R&D sec-
tor does not account for the redundancy of some research projects; ii) the intertemporal
spillover e￿ect: inventors do not account for that ideas they produce are used to produce










8new ideas; iii) the appropriability e￿ect : inventors appropriate only a part of the social
value they create; iv) the creative-destruction e￿ect. The global e￿ect resulting from these
distortions explains why the social value of an innovation is generally di￿erent from the
private one. On this point, there does not exist a clear theoretical consensus emerging
from the standard literature on endogenous growth. For instance, in the Romer’s model
(1990) with horizontal innovations, the private value is lower than the social one. How-
ever, Benassy (1998) showed that a slight modi￿cation of the Romer’s model can lead to
the opposite result. In the Aghion and Howitt model with vertical innovations (1992),
the private value can be either larger or smaller than the social one, depending upon the
parameters of the model.
However, there is an empirical evidence for a smaller private value. Jones and Williams
(1998) estimate that research investments are at least four times below what would be
socially optimal (on this point, see also Popp, 2006a, or Hart, 2008). In the following, we
base our analysis on this observation.
There are three stocks of knowledge, each associated with a speci￿c R&D sector (i.e.
the energy, the backstop and the CCS ones). We consider that each innovation is a non-
rival, indivisible and in￿nitely durable piece of knowledge (for instance, a scienti￿c report,
a data base, a software algorithm...) which is simultaneously used by the sector which
produces the good i and by the R&D sector i, i = fB;E;Sg. Thus, an innovation is
not directly embodied into tangible intermediate goods and it cannot be ￿nanced by the
sale of these goods. To circumvent this obstacle, one solution would consist in assuming
that ￿rms simultaneously produce output and undertake research. In that case, under
perfect competition and constant returns to rival inputs, once these inputs have been payed,
residual pro￿ts are nil. An imperfect competition framework would thus be required to
generate positive pro￿ts allowing the ￿rms to buy innovations, as it is done in Grimaud
and Rouge (2008). This type of development would lead to several di￿culties which are
out of the scope of the present study. Moreover, Grimaud and Rouge (2008) show that
Cournot competition does note prevent optimality when the labor supply is exogenous 5,
which is the case in our model.
In order to avoid any problem, we adopt a shortcut aiming at directly valuing innova-
tions. Basically, we proceed in three steps: i) In each research sector, we determine the
5Under Cournot competition, the real wage is lower than the optimal one, which implies an income
transfer from labor to capital activities. However, since we assume a single representative agent with
exogenous labor supply, this transfer has no e￿ect on the equilibrium quantities.
9social value of an innovation. Since an innovation is a non-rival good, this social value is the
sum of the marginal pro￿tabilities of this innovation in each sector using it. ii) Because of
the failures mentioned above, the private (or e￿ective) value in the absence research policy
is lower than the social one. iii) The research sectors are eventually subsidized in order to
reduce the gap between these two values.
Let us apply this three-steps procedure to the backstop R&D sector for instance. Each
innovation produced by this sector is used by this R&D sector itself as well as by the
backstop production sector. Thus, at each date t, the instantaneous social value of this
innovation is  vB;t =  vB
B;t +  v
HB
B;t, where  vB
B;t and  v
HB
B;t are the marginal pro￿tabilities of this
innovation in the backstop production sector and in the backstop R&D sector, respectively.
The social value of this innovation at t, or equivalently the optimal value at t of an in￿nitely




t rxdxds. The same procedure applies for any R&D sector
i, i = fB;E;Sg. We denote by i, 0 < i < 1, the rate of appropriability of the innovation
value by the market, i.e. the share of the social value which is e￿ectively paid to the
innovator, and by i (assumed constant for the sake of simplicity) the subsidy rate that
government can eventually apply. Note that if i = 1 i, the e￿ective value matches the
social one. The instantaneous e￿ective value (including subsidy) is:
vi;t = (i + i) vi;t (14)














; 8i = fB;E;Sg (16)
which equates the rate of return on the ￿nancial market to the rate of return on the R&D
sector i.
We can now analyze the R&D sector behavior. We assume that the dynamics of the
knowledge stock Hi;t is governed by the following innovation function Hi(:):
_ Hi;t = Hi(Ri;t;Hi;t) (17)
where Ri;t is the R&D investment into sector i. Function Hi(:) is assumed to be increasing
and concave in each argument6. At each time t, sector i supplies the ￿ow of innovations











10_ Hi;t at price Vi;t, so that its pro￿t function is 
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Finally, from the expressions of B
t and E
t , the marginal pro￿tabilities of a backstop, en-
ergy and CCS innovation in the production sectors using them, are given respectively
by  vB
B;t = @B
t =@HB;t = BHB=BIB,  vE
E;t = @E
t =@HE;t = EHE=EBBIB and  vE
S;t =
@E
t =@HS;t = tSHS. Therefore, the instantaneous e￿ective values (including subsidies) of
innovations are:































2.1.5 The household and the government
Denoting by Ct the consumption at time t, by U(:) the instantaneous utility function
(assumed to have the standard properties) and by  > 0 the pure rate of time preferences,
households maximize the welfare function W =
R 1
0 U(Ct)e dt subject to its dynamic
budget constraint:
_ Kt = rtKt + wtLt + t   Ct   Ta
t (23)
where t is the total pro￿ts gained in the economy and Ta
t is a lump-sum tax (subsidy-free)
that allows to balance the budget constraint of the government. This maximization leads




=  + tgC;t = rt ) U0(Ct) = U0(C0)et 
R t
0 rsds (24)
where t is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption, and
gC;t is the instantaneous growth rate of consumption.
Assuming that the government’s budget constraint is balanced at each time t (i.e. the
sum of the various taxes equals R&D subsidies), then we have:
Ta
t + t(Ft   St) =
X
i
Subi;t; i = fB;E;Sg (25)













Finally, the balance equation of the ￿nal output writes:
Qt = Ct + IF;t + IB;t + IS;t + IK;t + RE;t + RB;t + RS;t (27)
where IK;t is the instantaneous investment in capital, given by:
IK;t = _ Kt + Kt (28)
Hence, in our worldwide economy, the ￿nal output is devoted to aggregated consumption,
fossil fuel production, backstop production, CCS, capital accumulation and R&D.
2.2 The environment and damages
Let Gt be the atmospheric carbon concentration at time t and ,  > 0, the natural rate of
decay. The increase in Gt drives the global mean temperature away from a given state, here
the 1900 level. The di￿erence between this state and the present global mean temperature,
denoted by Tt, is taken here as the index of anthropogenic climate change. The climate
dynamics can thus be captured by the following system:
_ Gt = Ft   St   Gt (29)
_ Tt = (Gt)   mTt; m > 0 (30)
where (:) is a simpli￿ed radiative forcing function, assumed to be increasing and concave
in G, and m is a parameter of climatic inertia7.
Global warming generates economic damages that are measured, by convention, in
terms of ￿nal output losses through the scaling factor 
(Tt), with 
0(:) < 0. In addition
to the damage re￿ected by 
t, we will possibly be induced to impose a stabilization cap
on the carbon pollution stock that society can not overshoot (see for instance Chakravorty
et al., 2006):
Gt   G; 8t  0 (31)
7In the analytical treatment of the model, we assume, for the sake of clarity, that the carbon cycle
through atmosphere and oceans as well as the dynamic interactions between atmospheric and oceanic
temperatures, are captured by the reduced form (29) and (30). However, in the numerical simulations, we
adopt the full characterization of the climate module coming from the last version of DICE (Nordhaus,
2008).
12This additional constraint can be justi￿ed by the fact that the social damage function
is not able to re￿ect the entire environmental damages, but only part of it. In reality,
uncertainty in the climatic consequences of global warming can imply some discontinuities
in the damage, such as natural disasters or other strong irreversibilities, that are not taken
into account by the standard functional representation of the damage.
3 Decentralized equilibrium and welfare analysis
3.1 Characterization of the decentralized equilibrium
From the previous analysis of individual behaviors, we can now study the set of equilibria.
A particular equilibrium is associated with each quadruplet of policies fB;E;S;tg
1
t=0.
It is de￿ned as a vector of quantity trajectories fQt;Kt;Et;:::g
1
t=0 and a vector of price
pro￿les frt;pE;t;:::g
1
t=0 such that: i) ￿rms maximize pro￿ts, ii) the representative household
maximizes utility, iii) markets of private (i.e. rival) goods are perfectly competitive and
cleared, iv) in each R&D sectors i, innovators receive a share (i + i) of the social value
of innovations. Such an equilibrium is characterized by the set of equations given by
Proposition 1 below. Clearly, as analyzed in the following subsection, if the policy tools
are set to their optimal levels, these equations also characterize the ￿rst-best optimum
together with the system of prices that implements it.
Proposition 1 At each time t, for a given quadruplet of policies fB;E;S;tg
1
t=0, the
equilibrium in the decentralized economy is characterized by the following seven-equations
system:


























































=  + tgC;t (38)











is obtained from the equa-
tions (1), (2), (3), (11), (13) and (18), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A1.
Equation (32) is an arbitrage condition that equalizes the marginal net pro￿t from
the increase by one unit of fossil fuel extraction (LHS) to the total marginal gain if there
is no additional extraction (RHS)8. Equation (33) tells that the marginal productivity
of the backstop (LHS) equals its marginal cost (RHS). As already mentioned, equation
(34) formalizes the incentive e￿ect of the carbon tax on the decision to invest in CCS.
Equation (35) characterizes the standard trade-o￿ between capital Kt and consumption
Ct. Equation (36) (resp. (37) and (38)) characterizes the same kind of trade-o￿ between
speci￿c investment into backstop R&D sector, RB;t (resp. energy R&D sector, RE;t, and
CCS R&D sector, RS;t) and consumption. Obviously, the marginal return of each speci￿c
stock of knowledge Hi depends on the associated rate of subsidy i.
3.2 The decentralized equilibrium under maximization form
In order to solve numerically the market outcome, we show that it is possible to transform
the decentralized problem described above into a single maximization program. Proposition
2 explains how to proceed.







_ K = QfK;E[B(IB;HB];F(IF;Z);HE];L;A;







  fF(IF;Z)   S[F(IF;Z);IS;HS]g;
_ Hi = (i + i)Hi(Ri;Hi);
and _ Z = F(IF;Z)
leads to the same system of equations, (32)-(38), than in Proposition 1.
8If extraction increases by one unit, the associated revenue is QEEF and ￿rms face two kinds of costs:
the extraction cost, 1=FIF , and the pollution cost, (   SF). Conversely, if no more fossil resource
is extracted during the time interval dt, this generates an instantaneous gain due to the diminution in
speci￿c investment spending IF corresponding to (dIF=dt)=FjdF=0 =  FZ=FIF . Multiplying this term by
the marginal utility and integrating from t to 1 with the discount rate  gives the total gain in terms
of utility. Finally, dividing by U
0(C), this expression gives the gain in terms of output as speci￿ed in the
RHS of (32).
14Proof. See Appendix A2.
Proposition 2 can be read in fact as the welfare maximization program of a represen-
tative agent who would own all ￿rms (￿nal sector, energy-CCS, fossil fuel, backstop and
R&D) and who would face the same incentive policies (carbon tax, research subsidies)
than ￿rms in the decentralized economy. This approach is the same than the one followed
by Sinclair (1994) who also writes the market equilibrium under maximization form. The
main di￿erence with our model is that he assumes an exogenous rate of Hicks-neutral
technical change.
3.3 First-best optimum and implementation
The social planner problem consists in choosing fCt;Ri;t;Ij;tg
1
t=0 that maximizes the social
welfare W, subject to the various technological constraints, the output allocation constraint
(27), the state equations (8), (17), (28), (29), (30), and ￿nally, the ceiling constraint (31).
After eliminating the co-state variables, the ￿rst-order conditions leads to Proposition 3
below.

































































0(Tx)U0(Cx)e (m+)(x s)dx  0 and where 'G;s is the Lagrange mul-
tiplier associated with constraint (31), thus satisfying 'G;s  0, with 'G;s = 0 for any s
such that Gs <  G.
Proof. See Appendix A3.
15The interpretation of these conditions are almost the same than the ones formulated
in Proposition 1, excepted that, now, all the trade-o￿s are optimally solved. In other
respects, recall that, for a given set of public policies, a particular equilibrium is char-
acterized by conditions (32)-(38) of Proposition 1. This equilibrium will be said to be
optimal if it satis￿es the optimum characterizing conditions (39)-(45) of Proposition 2. By
analogy between these two sets of conditions, we can show that there exists a single quadru-
plet fB;E;S;tg
1
t=0 that implements the ￿rst-best. These ￿ndings are summarized in
Proposition 4 below.










i = 1   i for i = fB;E;Sg, and where
o
















Proof. First, if t = o
t , then conditions (39) and (41) are satis￿ed by using (32) and (34).
Second, (40) and (42) are identical to (33) and (35), respectively. Third, if i = 1 i, for
i = fB;E;Sg, then (43), (44) and (45) are identical to (36), (37) and (38), respectively.
Proposition 4 states ￿rst that, in any R&D sector, the optimal subsidy rate must be
equal to the share of the social value of innovations which is not captured by the market,
in order to entirely ￿ll the gap between the private value and the social one. In section
4, according to several empirical studies, we will postulate that i = 0:3, thus implying
o
i = 0:7 for i = fB;E;Sg.
Second, the optimal trajectory of the carbon tax is given by (46). Since 
0(Tt) < 0,
we have o
t  0 for any t  0. This expression reads as the ratio between the marginal
social cost of climate change ￿ the marginal damage in terms of utility coming from the
emission of an additional unit of carbon ￿ and the marginal utility of consumption. In
other words, it is the environmental cost (in terms of ￿nal good) of one unit of carbon in
the atmosphere. This carbon tax can be expressed as the sum of two components. The
￿rst one depends on the damage function and on the dynamics of the atmospheric carbon
stock and temperatures. It gives the discounted sum of marginal damages from t to 1
coming from the emission of an additional unit of carbon at date t. The second one is only
related to the ceiling constraint through 'G. It gives the social cost at t of one unit of
carbon in the atmosphere due to a tightening in the ceiling constraint. Then, the sum of
these two components is the instantaneous total social cost of one unit of carbon.
16Log-di￿erentiating (46) gives us the optimal growth rate of the tax:
_ t
t
=  +  + tgC;t +
['G;tet   0(Gt)Jt]
R 1
t ['G;ses   0(Gs)Js]e (+)(s t)ds
(47)
where  + tgC;t is equal to the interest rate rt. As in Goulder and Mathai (2000), the
dynamics of the optimal carbon tax results from the combination of three components.
The sum of the two ￿rst ones, i.e. the optimal appropriate discount rate  + rt in the
terminology of Goulder and Mathai, is unambiguously positive. The last component in (47)
re￿ects the full social cost of one unit of carbon, including both the direct marginal damage
and the social cost of the carbon ceiling, and is unambiguously negative. It generalizes
Goulder and Mathai’s result to the case where a damage function and a carbon cap are
simultaneously considered. To sum up, we have two opposite e￿ects meaning that the
carbon tax can either rise or fall over time9;10. In the following section, we illustrate this
point by depicting some monotonous or non-monotonous trajectories depending on the
relative weights of these e￿ects. We will observe that, in the absence of carbon cap, the
last component is relatively weak with respect to the discount term, and thus the tax is
rising over time. Under ceiling constraint, this last term becomes stringent at the time the
ceiling is reached and the tax exhibits an invert U-shape trajectory.
4 Numerical results
4.1 Calibration and scenarios
Functional forms and calibration of the associated parameters are mainly provided by the
last version of DICE (Nordhaus, 2008) for the climate module, the ￿nal output, the social
preferences, the feedbacks on economic productivity from climate change, the total factor
productivity and demographic dynamics. The energy production and R&D characteriza-
tions come from ENTICE-BR (Popp, 2006a). For CCS technology, we use a speci￿cation
derived from the sequestration cost function used in DEMETER (Gerlagh and van der
Zwaan, 2006) and the calibration is updated from the IPCC special report on CCS (2005).
Others calibrations are provided by IEA data. All these details are referred to appendix
A4. The starting year is 2005.
To study the e￿ects of policy instruments, we solve the equilibrium for various values
9In the case where the is only a ceiling and no damage, the tax is unambiguously rising over time as
long as the ceiling is not reached since 'G;t = 0 8t such that Gt <  G.
10For discussions about the optimal time path of the carbon tax, see also for instance Sinclair, 1994,
Ulph and Ulph, 1994, Farzin and Tahvonen, 1996, Hoel and Kverndokk, 1996, or Chakravorty et al., 2006.
17of  and , by using the method described in Proposition 2. Note that we restrict the
scenarios to the case where, 8i, i = 0:3 and we will discuss later about the sensitivity of
the model to this parameter. Moreover, we consider only symmetric R&D policies, i.e. the
case where i is independent of i.11 The selected cases are listed in Table 1.
Scenario t  Comment
A 0 0 Laisser-faire
B sb
t 0 Second-best tax, no R&D subsidy
C 0 0.7 R&D subsidies, no carbon tax
D o
t 0:7 First-best optimum (without ceiling)
E 550
t 0.7 Optimum with a 550ppm cap
F 450
t 0:7 Optimum with a 450ppm cap
Table 1: Summary of the various scenarios for i = 0:3, i = fB;E;Sg
The benchmark case A refers to the laisser-faire equilibrium (BAU), in which neither
environmental tax nor R&D subsidies are set. In scenario B, we study the e￿ect on the
equilibrium of an environmental tax by assuming zero i’s and by setting t equal to its
second-best optimal level, sb.12 Similarly, in scenario C, we analyze the impact of R&D
subsidy rates by assuming  = 0 and  = 1  = 0:7.13 Scenario D refers to the ￿rst-best
optimum without carbon cap. Finally, two stabilization caps of 450 and 550ppm, which are
enforced owing to the speci￿c tax trajectories 550
t and 450
t respectively, are also studied
(cases E and F).
4.2 Summary of results
We adopt the following notations to summarize the e￿ects of the various policy combina-
tions. XjA!D stands for the change in variable X due to a simultaneous increase of 
from 0 to o and of the ’s from 0 to o. These changes are illustrated in the following ￿g-
ures by a shift from the "scenario A" trajectories to the "scenario D" trajectories. XjA!B
11We do not discuss here about the di￿erentiated e￿ects of the R&D subsidies. In a model with two
R&D sectors, Grimaud and La￿orgue (2008) show that cross e￿ects are very weak, i.e. an R&D policy in
a particular sector has no crowding out impact on the other sector. With more than two R&D sectors, a
large number of scenarios can be considered, so that we let these developments for future research.
12Formally, it is the tax trajectory that maximizes social welfare given the constraint of zero research
subsidy, in the set of decentralized equilibria. For more details on second-best policies, see Grimaud and
La￿orgue (2008).
13Although the optimal subsidy rates are the same in scenarios C, D, E and F, the amount of subsidies
that are distributed among R&D sectors may di￿er, cf. equation (26).
18is the change of X due to an increase in  from 0 to sb, given  = 0. Symmetrically, given
 = 0, XjA!C denotes the change in variable X due to a simultaneous increase of the
’s from 0 to o. Finally, XjD!E=F measures the change in X due to an increase in the
tax level (i.e. the introduction of a ceiling constraint), given the optimal enforcement of
the R&D policies. Table 3 provides the signs of the ’s for the main variables of interest
(where insigni￿cant changes are depicted by ).
X XjA!D XjA!B XjA!C XjD!E
pF       
cF + +  +
pB       
pE + +   +
VHB +  + +
VHE      
VHS + +  +
F      (weak)  
B + +(weak) + +
E     +  
S + +(weak)  +
HB +  + +
HE +  + 
HS + +(weak)  +
RB +  + +
RE +  + 
RS + +(weak)  +
QB + + + +
QF      (weak)  
QS + +(weak)  +
G, T      (weak)  
Q   then +   then + +   then +
C +   then + +   then +
Table 2: Summary of economic policy e￿ects
4.3 Numerical simulations
4.3.1 Optimal carbon tax and energy prices
As depicted in Figure 2, the ￿rst-best tax level starts from 49$/tC and follows a quite linear
increase to reach 256$/tC by 2105. The impossibility to enforce any research policy leads
to a second-best tax which is slightly higher than the ￿rst-best one, starting from 49.6$/tC
and rising to 275$/tC in 2105. The stabilization to 550 and 450 requires much higher tax
19levels. Starting from respectively 73 and 172$/tC, they increase sharply, reach some high
550$/tC and 735$/tC in 2075 and 2055, before declining once the concentration ceiling has
been reached. Naturally, the rate of increase of the carbon prices for the 450ppm target is
more rapid than that of the 550ppm case. These carbon prices prove slightly higher than
Nordhaus (2008) estimates for similar climate strategies.
In the case where a carbon target is introduced, the tax pace evolves non-monotonically
over time. Indeed, as long as the ceiling is not reached, the Lagrange multiplier 'G
associated to the ceiling constraint is nil, and it becomes positive at the moment the
constraint is binding. Since the last component in equation (47) is strengthened by this
multiplier, the date at which the tax starts to decline and the date at which the carbon


























Figure 2: Optimal environmental taxes
Let us now analyze the e￿ect of these tax trajectories on the prices of primary energies.
First, the fossil fuel market price increases only slowly due to the relative ￿atness of our
fossil fuel supply curve (see Figure 3-a). The implementation of a carbon tax reduces
the producer price which induces substantial rent transfers from extractive industries to
governments. In 2105, the revenues losses for the fossil energy producer amount to 55% and
52% when carbon caps are set at 550 and 450ppm, respectively. The concerns of oil-rich
countries towards stringent climate mitigation commitments has already been commented
and assessed in the literature (see for example Bergstrom, 1982, or Sinn, 2008). Moreover,
an increment in the R&D subsidy rates has no e￿ect on the fossil fuel price, thus illustrating
the absence of crossed e￿ects in this case.
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Figure 3: Fossil fuel and backstop prices
Simultaneously, introducing a carbon tax implies obviously a rise in the unit user cost
of the fossil fuel (cf. cF;t as de￿ned by (7)), as observed by comparing the upper trajectories
of cases a to d in Figure 4. When carbon emissions are penalized, this creates an incentive
for energy ￿rms to store a part of these emissions so that their cost of using fossil fuel
is obtained by adding two components to the fossil fuel market price: i) the tax on the
emissions released in the atmosphere and ii) the unit cost of CCS. Such a decomposition
is depicted in Figure 4. The incentives to use CCS devices, and thus the CCS unit cost,
are contingent to an high level of tax, or equivalently to a constraining carbon target.
Second, the decreasing market price of the backstop energy reveals largely a￿ected by
the introduction of research subsidies, as can be seen from Figure 3-b. Such subsidies stim-
ulate backstop research, thereby increasing its productivity and then, reducing production
cost. They allow the backstop price to be cut by half by 2105. Moreover, two di￿erent
streams of trajectories can be identi￿ed. The higher ones are drawn for cases A and B, i.e.
when backstop R&D is not granted at all whereas the lower ones imply some positive B.
Then, R&D subsidies mainly matter to explain a decrease in the backstop price whereas
the level of tax has only a weak depressive e￿ect. Again, there is no crossed e￿ect.
4.3.2 R&D
The e￿ects of directed technical change can be portrayed by examining the e￿ective value
of an innovation in both CCS and backstop R&D, VB and VS, as depicted in Figure 5.14
14Results on energy R&D are less of interest and are not discussed here.



































































































Figure 4: Decomposition of the unit cost of fossil fuel use
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Figure 5: E￿ective innovation values in backstop and CCS R&D
22The behavior of these innovation values provide insights on the allocation and the
direction of R&D funding over time. First, the rising values demonstrate that the innova-
tion activity grows strongly during the century, with the exception of the laisser-faire case
which does not provide incentive for investing in CCS. Second, the increase in innovation
values is strongly governed by the stringency of climate policy. Clearly, the introduction
of a carbon ceiling induces the fastest increase in the e￿ective value of innovations. Third,
the role of each mitigation option can be inferred from the time-path of both CCS and
backstop innovation values: CCS innovation value grows fast from the earliest periods,
reaches a peak by around 2075 and starts declining thereafter. On the contrary, the back-
stop innovation value keeps on rising over time, though at a slow pace initially. A simple
supply-demand argument is necessary to understand these behaviors. As the innovation
activity is growing fast, due to the urgent need of developing carbon-free energy supply,
and as the expected returns on CCS R&D are the highest initially because of relatively low
cost of technology improvement relative to the backstop, a "technology push" in favor of
CCS cause its innovation value to rise fast. In the longer run, backstop energy o￿ers larger
deployment potential and thus takes over CCS investments. Its value then develops at a
faster pace while the CCS innovation is becoming less valued as its development shrinks.
These innovation values drive the R&D expenses ￿owing to each research sector. Figure
6 depicts such R&D investments for our major cases. In the polar laisser-faire case, hardly
any R&D budget is dedicated to research and CCS R&D is not ￿nanced at all. A similar
outcome occurs when an optimal tax is set while research subsidies are nil. When all
research subsidies are optimally set without carbon tax, R&D allowances do not pro￿t the
CCS sector but mainly the backstop research sector that receives similar amounts to the
￿rst-best optimal case. The ￿rst-best optimum restoration calls for a continuous increase
in R&D budgets that will mainly bene￿t the development of the backstop technology. By
the end of the century, overall R&D budgets will then have been multiplied by a factor of
roughly 10, amounting to slightly less than 1 billion USD. The energy e￿ciency sector and
the CCS sector receive respectively 13 and 17% of total R&D budgets in 2100. Looking
at the two stabilization cases, one notices drastic changes in R&D budgets allocation
and volumes. By the end of century, the overall R&D budgets exceed the ones obtained
when restoring the ￿rst-best solution. The necessity of curbing quickly the net polluting
emissions ￿ow leads to substantial investments in CCS R&D that constitutes the cheapest
mid-term mitigation option. The more stringent the carbon target, the higher is the share
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Figure 6: Intensity of dedicated R&D investments (i.e. Ri=Q)
Two conclusions can be drawn so far. The implementation a carbon tax alone hardly
provides any incentive to proceed with R&D activities. In order to provide enough R&D
incentives, one needs ￿rst to correct for the externality by imposing a carbon tax and
second by subsidizing the research sectors. Moreover, short term investment in carbon-free
R&D, namely in CCS activities, can become relevant when imposing a stringent cap on
carbon accumulation, or equivalently, an higher level of tax.
244.3.3 Impacts on the energy mix
Let us now turn to the development of primary energy use throughout the century. As
seen from Figure 7, the laisser-faire case induces a ￿ve-fold increase in energy use over the
century, driven by strong economic growth and the absence of policy restrictions. Because
of the lack of incentive (no carbon tax), the CCS technology is not utilized at all. In
addition, despite the fossil fuel price growth over time, the backstop technology remains
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Figure 7: Primary energy use
When moving from case A to case B, the implementation of the optimal carbon tax
25alone does not result in substantial carbon sequestration, and/or backstop penetration.
However, the fossil fuel share, and then the total primary energy use, are strongly reduced.
Symmetrically, the implementation of research policies alone (i.e. moving from case A to
case C) does not a￿ect the fossil fuel use, but it slightly stimulates the backstop.
The simultaneous implementation of all optimal instruments (i.e. from case A to case
D) reveals a complementarity e￿ect between research grants and carbon taxation. Indeed,
this scenario reinforces the e￿ect of the tax on the fossil fuel use as observed in case B,
and it increases the fraction of carbon emissions that are e￿ectively sequestered (up to 4%
of total carbon emissions in 2100). In addition, such a policy mix strengthens the role of
backstop.
Finally, the two stabilization cases induce radical changes in world energy supply be-
cause of the sharp increase of carbon prices. This results in strong reductions of fossil fuel
use, and thus of energy use, especially in the short-term where substitution possibilities
with carbon-free energy are not yet available. By 2050, energy demand will have been
reduced by 47% in the 550 ppm case, and by 60% in the 450 ppm case, as compared with
the unconstrained optimum. In addition, the large amounts of R&D budgets allocated
to CCS and backstop research sectors produce the expected bene￿ts and allow for a deep
mitigation of climate change owing to the decarbonisation of the economy both via the
massive introduction of sequestration and via the backstop. When these carbon-free alter-
natives become economical, energy use rises again to reach similar levels to the laisser-faire
ones in 2100. By that time, the backstop energy supplies 46% and 42% of total energy
consumption. In the 550 and 450ppm cases, the CCS-based fossil fuel use accounts for
40% and 49% of total energy use in the 550 and 450ppm cases respectively. Therefore the
lower the carbon target, the higher is the share of emission-free fossil fuel use.
4.3.4 Climate feedbacks on output
The environmental consequences of alternative scenarios are represented in Figure 8-a. The
decentralized market outcome without any policy intervention involves a more intensive
energy use without CO2 removal and thus a faster carbon accumulation above to some
dangerous 1000ppm level (IPCC, 2007). The implementation of optimal instruments limits
the increase of atmospheric carbon accumulation to 800ppm by 2100. The implementation
of the sole optimal tax without further R&D subsidies leads a slightly higher level of
850ppm. Notice that the sole optimal subsidies without CO2 pricing just prove as ine￿cient
26from the environmental point of view.
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Figure 8: Atmospheric carbon concentration and damages
Figure 8-b shows the feedbacks of these atmospheric carbon concentrations on the
economic damages, as measured in terms of ￿nal output. Policy inaction would lead to
5% of gross world product (GWP) losses per year by 2100, which is slightly lower then the
forecasts established by Stern (2006). At the opposite, the implementation of the more
stringent carbon cap, i.e. 450 ppm, limits these damages to 1% of GWP by 2100. Between
these two extreme cases, the ranking of the trajectories among the various scenarios is the
same than the one depicted in Figure 8-a.
Figure 9-a gives the GWP time-development as a percentage of the one from the laisser-
faire case. The sole implementation of optimal subsidies improves the GWP at any date.
The implementation of the optimal tax alone reveal costly until the end of the century.
More importantly, setting economic instruments to their optimal values leads to further
GWP losses in the short and mid term compared to the market outcome without inter-
vention. In the longer run though, GWP increases signi￿cantly again and catches up the
laisser-faire trajectory by 2095, to reach even higher gains eventually, up to 8% in 2145. To
sum up: i) The presence of a carbon tax implies some GWP losses for the earlier genera-
tions, and some gains for the future ones. In other words, The long run economic growth is
always enhanced when climate change issue is addressed with a carbon tax. ii) The larger
the tax is, i.e. the lower the carbon ceiling is, the stronger the initial losses but also the
higher the long run gains.
Figure 9-b depicts the same kind of variations, but now applied to consumption, and
thus to welfare. Except for the optimal case D, this ￿gure drives to the same conclusions
27than the previous one. However, we observe now that the simultaneous implementation
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Figure 9: Final output and consumption variations as compared with the laisser-faire
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
As the choice of the parameter , i.e. the rate of appropriability of the innovation value by
the market, is crucial, it is worth examining how a change in this parameter a￿ects other
key variables. This last section is thus devoted to such a sensitivity analysis. Until now
this rate of appropriability was set at 0.3. We explore the implications of two alternative
values: 0.2 and 0.4. Table 3 summarizes the percentage deviation of some selected key
variables. Since the penetration of CCS technology is only modest in scenario A, we here
focus on scenario B. Given the model structure, an increase or a decrease by 10 percentage
points do not have symmetric e￿ects on other variables but still produce some changes
in the same order of magnitude. More importantly, the percentage deviations increase
substantially over time. As seen from equations (14) and (15), the innovations values
(variables VHB and VHS) are directly and largely a￿ected by such parameter changes. And
therefore knowledge in backstop and CCS technologies (variables HB and HS) accumulates
much faster (for  = 0:4). This is particularly true for CCS which plays a key role by the
middle of the century and requires fast improvement prior to its wide-scale deployment.
As a consequence, when parameter  is set at 0.2, backstop use decreases by 10% in 2105
while CCS use decreases by 36%. Alternatively, when parameter  is set at 0.4, backstop
and CCS use increase by 12% and up to 47% respectively within the same time horizon.
28 = 0:2  = 0:4
X 2015 2055 2105 2015 2055 2105
sb 0,2 0,4 1,1 -0,2 -0,3 -1
pB 0,2 1,8 4,9 -0,2 -2 -5,3
VHB -34,8 -33,6 -31,9 34,5 34 30,4
VHS -37,8 -36,3 -35,6 42,2 38,7 38,2
F 0,1 0,4 0,8 -0,1 -0,5 -1
B -0,3 -3,8 -9,7 0,3 4,6 12,3
S -4,4 -21,3 -35,9 4,4 26,1 46,9
HB -0,2 -1,8 -4,7 0,2 2 5,6
HS -4,4 -21,4 -36,1 4,5 26,6 47,5 P
i Ri -24,2 -40 -41,5 41,4 43,7 48,9
Table 3: Deviation (in %) of variable X when  moves from 0.3 to 0.2 and 0.4, respectively,
for scenario B.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis primarily consisted in decentralizing the "top-down" ENTICE-BR model
(Popp, 2006a) in order to characterize the full set of equilibria. In addition to the backstop,
we also considered a second abatement possibility by adding to the original model a CCS
sector, together with an associated dedicated R&D activity. Simultaneously, in order
to account for further climate change damages that are not integrated in the damage
function, we imposed a cap on the atmospheric carbon accumulation. Since the economy
faces two types of market failures, global warming and R&D spillovers, the regulator uses
two types of public tools to correct them, a carbon tax and a subsidy for each R&D
sector. A particular equilibrium is associated with each vector of instruments. First, we
provided a characterization of this set of equilibria (Proposition 1). Second, we showed that
we can obtain any decentralized equilibrium as the solution of a maximization program
(Proposition 2). Third, we characterized the ￿rst-best optimum (Proposition 3) and we
showed that there exists a unique vector of policy tools that implements it (Proposition 4).
We calculated the optimal tax and subsidies analytically and we investigated their dynamic
properties. In the line with Goulder and Mathai (2000) and Ulph and Ulph (1994), we
veri￿ed that the optimal carbon tax is generally non-monotonic over time and follows an
inverted U-shaped time-path. It falls once the ceiling is reached.
In a second step, we have used a calibrated version of the theoretical model based on
DICE 2007 (Nordhaus, 2008), ENTICE-BR (Popp, 2006a) and DEMETER (Gerlagh et al.,
2006), to assess the environmental and economic impacts of various climate change policies.
29In addition to the standard comparison of the ￿rst-best outcome with the laisser-faire, we
also provide some intermediate scenarios in which we analyze the separated impacts of the
policy tools. Our main ￿ndings are the following.
i) Our results do not exhibit signi￿cant crossed e￿ects in the sense that the implemen-
tation of a carbon tax alone hardly provides any incentive to conduct R&D activities and
backstop production, when R&D policies used alone have only weak e￿ects on the fossil
fuel and CCS sectors.
ii) The simultaneous use of the two types of tools reinforces the individual e￿ects of
each one used alone, thus revealing complementarity between research grants and carbon
taxation.
iii) The ￿rst-best case (without ceiling) does not result in substantial carbon seques-
tration.
iv) A carbon cap reinforces the role of CCS as a mid-term option for mitigating the
climate change. In the longer term, if the policy-maker aims at stabilizing the climate, the
massive introduction of backstop energy is necessary.
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Appendix
A1. Proof of Proposition 1









The ￿rst characterizing condition (32) is obtained by replacing  into (9) by the expression
above, and by noting that pF = QEEF   (   SF)=SIS from (3), (4) and (6), and that
exp( 
R t
0 rds) = U0(C)exp( t)=U0(C0) from (24). Combining (3), (5) and (13) leads to
condition (33). Condition (34) directly comes from (6). Next, using (1) and (24), we









; i = fB;E;Sg: (48)







Ri; 8i = fB;E;Sg: (49)
We thus obtain conditions (36), (37) and (38) by replacing into (49) vB, vE and vS by
their expressions (20), (21) and (22), respectively.
33A2. Proof of Proposition 2
Let J be the discounted value of the Hamiltonian of the maximization program of Propo-
sition 2:
J = U(C)e t + ~ 
(
Q[K;E[B(IB;HB);F(IF;Z);HE];L;A;














~ i(i + i)Hi(Ri;Hi) + ~ F(IF;Z)
The associated ￿rst order conditions are:
@J
@C
= U0(C)e t   ~  = 0 (50)
@J
@IF
= ~ [QEEFFIF   1   FIF(   SF)] + ~ FIF = 0 (51)
@J
@IB
= ~ (QEEBBIB   1) = 0 (52)
@J
@IS
=  ~ (1   SIS) = 0 (53)
@J
@Ri
=  ~  + ~ i(i + i)Hi
Ri = 0; i = fB;E;Sg (54)
@J
@K
= ~ (QK   ) =  _ ~  (55)
@J
@Hi
= ~ QEEHi + ~ i(i + i)Hi
Hi =  _ ~ i; i = fB;Eg (56)
@J
@HS
= ~ SHS + ~ S(S + S)HS
HS =  _ ~ S (57)
@J
@Z
= ~ [QEEFFZ   FZ(   SF)] + ~ FZ =  _ ~  (58)
and the transversality conditions are:
lim
t!1
~ K = lim
t!1
~ iHi = lim
t!1
~ Z = 0 (59)
Replacing into (58) ~  by its expression coming from (51), we ￿nd _ ~  =  ~ FZ=FIF.







Plugging this expression in (51) and using (50) again, one gets condition (32). Equations
(52) and (53) directly imply (33) and (34). Using (50) and (55), one gets (35). The













34Replacing into (56), ~ =~ i and _ ~ i=~ i by their expressions coming from (54) and (61), we
obtain conditions (36) and (37). The same calculation applied to (57) ￿nally leads to (38).
A3. Proof of Proposition 3
Let H be the discounted value of the Hamiltonian of the optimal program:
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The associated ￿rst order conditions are:
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= U0(C)e t    = 0 (62)
@H
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= (QEEFFIF   1) + FIF + GFIF(   SF) = 0 (63)
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@IB
= (QEEBBIB   1) = 0 (64)
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0(T)   mT =  _ T (72)
The complementary slackness condition and the transversality conditions are:











TT = 0 (74)
From (63), we ￿nd that  =  G(   SF)   (QEEF   1=FIF). Replacing this
expression into (70) and using (62) leads to the following di￿erential equation: _  =
35 (FZ=FIF)U0(C)exp( t). Integrating this expression and using the transversality con-







Replacing into (63) , G and  by their expressions coming from (62), (65) and (75),
respectively, gives us the equation (39) of Proposition 2. Equation (40) directly comes
from condition (64). From (62) and (72), we have: _ T = mT   Q

0(T)U0(C)exp( t).
















where T is de￿ned by (76) and 'G must be determined by looking at the behavior of the
economy once the ceiling have been reached. Condition (41) is then obtained by replacing
into (65)  and G by their expressions coming from (62) and (77), respectively. Log-
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Condition (42) is a direct implication of equations (67) and (78). Finally, the log-di￿erentiation












Conditions (43) and (44) come from (66), (68), (78), (79) and from (64) by using QEEB =
1=BIB. Similarly, condition (45) is obtained from (65), (66), (69), (78) and (79).
36A4. Calibration of the model
Based on DICE (Nordhaus, 2008), ENTICE-BR (Popp, 2006a) and DEMETER (Gerlagh,
2006), we use the following speci￿ed forms15:
Q(K;E;L;A;
) = 
AKEL1  ; ; 2 (0;1)
L = L0e
R t
0 gLds A = A0e
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BIBH
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1 + TT2 1 ; T > 0
Next, let us provide some calibration details here. According to IEA (2007), world
carbon emissions in 2005 amounted to 17.136 GtCO2. We retain 7.401 GtCeq as the initial
fossil fuel consumption, given in gigatons of carbon equivalent. In addition, carbon-free
energy produced out of renewable energy, excluding biomass and nuclear, represented 6%
of total primary energy supply. We thus retain another 0.45 GtCeq as the initial amount
of backstop energy use. We retain the Gerlagh’s assumption for the cost of CCS that is
worth 150US$/tC. According to IEA (2006), the cumulative CO2 storage capacity is in the
order of 184 million tons per year. This value serves as a seed value for sequestration level,
S0, in the initial year, which is then ￿xed at 0.05 GtC. The cost of CCS sequestration and
the initial storage level allow for the calibration of the initial sequestration e￿ort using the
following relation: IS;0=S0 =CCS cost, which implies IS;0 = 0:05GtC150$=tC=7.5G$.
The total factor productivity has been adjusted so as to produce a similar pattern of
GWP development until 2100 to the one from DICE-08. The rates of return on both
R&D spending and knowledge accumulation have been set to 0.3 and 0.2 respectively so
as provide long term sequestration in line with IPCC (2007) projections. Without loss of
generality, the initial stock of knowledge dedicated to CCS is set equal to 1. Calibration
15We replace the cost function of fossil fuel and backstop from Popp (2006a) and the cost function
of sequestration from Gerlagh (2006) by their corresponding production functions in order to derive an
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BH
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37of the other parameters come from DICE or ENTICE-BR. Table 4 below provides some
more details.
Param. Value Description Source
 0.3 Capital elasticity in output prod. DICE
 0.07029 Energy elasticity in output prod. DICE
T 0.0028388 Scaling param. on damage DICE
B Elasticity of subs. for backstop Calibrated
E 0.38 Elasticity of subs. for energy ENTICE-BR
H 0.336 Scaling param. of HE on energy ENTICE-BR
F0 7.401 2005 fossil fuel use in GtC IEA
cF 400 2005 fossil fuel price in USD IEA
F 700 Scaling param. on fossil fuel cost ENTICE-BR
F 4 Exponent in fossil fuel prod. ENTICE-BR
B0 0.45 2005 backstop use in GtC IEA
B 1200 2005 backstop price in USD DICE
B Exponent in backstop prod. Calibrated
aB 0.0122 Scaling param. in backstop innovation ENTICE-BR
aE 0.0264 Scaling param. in energy innovation ENTICE-BR
bB 0.3 Rate of return of backstop R&D ENTICE-BR
bE 0.2 Rate of return of energy R&D ENTICE-BR
cS 150 Sequestration cost in 2005 USD/tC DEMETER
S0 0.05 2005 sequestration in GtC IPCC
QS;0 7:5 2005 sequestration e￿ort in bill. USD IPCC
HS;0 1 2005 level of knowledge in CCS Calibrated
RS;0 0.5 2005 R&D investment in CCS in bill. USD Calibrated
aS 0.5 Scaling param. in CCS innovation Calibrated
bS 0.3 Rate of return of CCS R&D Calibrated
S 0.2 Elasticity of knowledge in CCS innovation Calibrated
i 0.54 Elasticity of knowledge in innovation ENTICE-BR
 2 Elasticity of intertemporal subst. DICE
 0.015 Time preference rate DICE
At Total factor productivity trend DICE
Lt World population trend DICE
Table 4: Calibration of the main parameters
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